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Abstract—PMU data has the potential of providing a wealth
of information on power system operation, health, faults and
anomalies. PMU tend to provide tens of measurements per
second, therefore automated anomaly detection is required;
especially for use in real or near-time applications by power
system operators. This paper demonstrates a method of detecting
local anomalies in PMU data utilizing multiple linear regression.
A window of near-time data is employed to generate a regression
function that predicts the live data that arrives. If the error
between the observed and predicted values exceeds a threshold
an exception is noted. The threshold is dynamically updated
based on the error in the regression function, allowing the
method to work equally well on data of varying regularity. This
anomaly detection method is not tuned to particular events and
should detect novel occurrences. The method is evaluated on two
numerical case studies, a genuine power system event and a man
in the middle cyber attack. Real data was collected from PMUs
placed on the Irish power system.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection, PMU, machine learning,
linear regression, cyber security
I. INTRODUCTION
Many methods exist for event detection and these are often
employed in digital fault recorders (DFR). A typical method
is to set simple thresholds for frequency, RoCoF, sequence
components, harmonics or magnitude variations. Care must be
taken when choosing thresholds as the region between missing
events and near constant triggering can be small. Although
typical thresholds will vary between power systems, they will
also vary between sites, meaning each placement may need to
be separately evaluated and monitored; preventing large scale
rapid deployment. The method demonstrated in this paper is
adaptive both to the local environment, both spatially and
temporally, as the event threshold is updated based on the
data recorded in the previous seconds.
As well as legitimate power system events, other anomalies
can appear in the synchrophasor information due to ‘bad data.’
This can happen in a number of ways. For example, a missing
GPS signal can cause deviation in phase-angle estimation due
to a misaligned phase-locked loop. Information on GPS lock
is usually sent in the PMU data stream, but unless this is
processed by the application, the error can persist through the
phasor estimation stage. Hardware or software related data
acquisition errors are also possible due to hardware failure,
or where mis-configured analog-to-digital (ADC) modules or
software processing (pre-phasor estimation) lead to errors in
the output of the phasor-estimation section of the PMU.
Another, more sinister possibility is that the PMU data
had been modified in transit deliberately. The most prevalent
standard in use today for synchrophasor transport is IEEE
C37.118.2 (2005 or 2011) [1]. This PMU data transport
protocol contains no security mechanisms at all, [2], and is
highly susceptible to ‘in-transit’ manipulation. Considering the
historic use of PMU data for post-fault analysis, this may not
seem like much of an issue. However, PMU has the potential
to become widely used for real-time analysis and as inputs to
advanced control systems - therefore this type of attack vector
requires consideration and system design.
Whether it’s a legitimate event, an unlikely data acquisition-
level fault, or an even less likely targeted data-stream manip-
ulation, the method presented in this paper detects anomalous
activity that may cause inappropriate PMU response. It will
allow anomalous data to be quickly ’flagged’ for further
analysis.
To achieve high accuracy in the detection of anomalies
in PMU data, this paper has (1) employed Multiple Linear
Regression Analysis for the prediction of a power system
variable based on previous measurements and other recorded
variables in the power system; (2) developed a metric for
the threshold of detecting anomalies in PMU data based on
the difference between observed and predicted values; (3)
implemented a sliding window approach to the methodology
to dynamically update thresholds for anomaly detection us-
ing current, relevant power system parameters; (4) validated
the proposed method through two numerical case studies of
anomalous data collected from the Irish power system, a
genuine power system event and a MITM attack on system
frequency measurement on PMU data.
II. MACHINE LEARNING FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
Machine learning [3] is described as the construction of
methods which automatically improve with experience. These
can be split into two main types, supervised and unsupervised.
Supervised learning is when the training data consists of ex-
amples of inputs and corresponding targets (typical problems
are classification and regression), whilst unsupervised learning
is when the training data consists of inputs only with targets
unknown but worked out by the algorithm (clustering is a
typical problem). A typical machine learning problem consists
of two main phases, these are learning and prediction.
Fig. 1: Flow Chart for the proposed methodology for anomaly detection on
PMU data using multiple regression analysis
A. Regression Analysis
Regression Analysis [4] is a technique in machine learning
that is used to determine the relationship between two (simple
regression) or more (multiple regression) variables. The goal
of regression analysis is to determine the value of parameters
for a function that gives the best fit line through a set of
observations (learning phase), thus allowing the prediction
of one variable based on the other recorded variables and
the regression model (prediction phase). In this section the
two most basic and commonly used regression types will be
presented, these are simple and multiple linear regression.
A.1. Simple Linear Regression
In this case the model is bivariate, and shows the relation-
ship between one independent variable (predictor), x, and a
dependent variable (response), Y , is given by:
Y = β0 + β1x+  (1)
β0 and β1 represent the model coefficients, with β0 represent-
ing the intercept and β1 the coefficient of x (or the parameter
of the slope), and  the error in the model. A regression model
can then be determined by learning the values of β0 and β1
from equation 1 for a training dataset of x and y values. Using
the regression model a new Y sample can be predicted using
the corresponding x value for the sample and equation 1.
A.2. Multiple Linear Regression
Multiple predictors are used in the model to build the rela-
tionship between predictors and response variables. Denoting
a set of samples in a dataset at the i-th sample instant as
zi ∈ <1×n, a data matrix Z ∈ <i×n can be constructed with
each row representing a sample, where i is the number of
samples and n the number of variables in the matrix Z. If
a single variable is selected as a response (y) and the other
variables selected as predictors (x1, x2, x3...xn−1), then for
the i-th sample the regression equation is given as:
yi = β0+β1xi,1+β2xi,2+β3xi,3+ ...+βn−1xi,n−1+i (2)
where, similarly as before, β values represent the model
coefficients, with β0 representing the intercept, and β1...βn−1
representing the coefficient of each element of X, where
X = xi,1...xi,n−1 respectively, and and  the error. Again,
once the values of β have been calculated for a training dataset
of X and y values, a regression model can then be used for
the prediction of y values given X.
B. Adaptive PMU Anomaly Detection
The basic process for the proposed method is presented in
Fig 1, and is separated into three main components. These are:
1) Initialization; 2) On-line Monitoring; and 3) Update Model.
The initial stage of the method allows the construction of the
initial regression model, and requires power system data for
frequency (f ), phase angle (φ) and voltage (v) and their rate
of change (RoC) is calculated for each variable (∆f , ∆φ and
∆v respectively).
In the study presented the variables that were chosen for
the construction of the initial regression model were:
Predictors
• Frequency
• Rate of change of frequency (RoCoF)
• Voltage
• Rate of change of voltage (RoCoV)
Response
• Rate of change of phase (RoCoP)
After the initial regression model has been constructed,it can
be used to predict the next response value from the predictor
values.
B.1. Sliding Window Regression
An adaptive regression technique was required to allow the
model to be re-trained as power system conditions are con-
tinuously changing. The methodology incorporates a sliding
window [5] approach. The model is continuously retrained as
new data is received. Important parameters for optimization
are window size and how often model retraining occurs.
B.2. Anomaly Detection - 68–95–99.7 rule
In literature the method of detecting anomalous data by
calculating standard deviation from the mean has been exten-
sively researched [6], and can be known as the 68-95-99.7 rule.
In normally distributed datasets the amount of data that lies
between 1 standard deviation of the mean is 68%, 2 standard
deviations is 95% and 3 standard deviations is 99.7%.
The standard deviation is calculated from the RMS error,
between the observed and predicted data within the sliding
window, and is expressed as:√√√√ n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2
n
(3)
where yi and yˆi are the observed and predicted values for the
i-th observation and n the number of samples.
The choice of the number of standard deviation from
the mean of RMS error was investigated, and findings are
presented in Fig 4. This figure displays an initial regression
model for normal power system operating data, with the top
plot showing the observed and predicted RoCoP values whilst
the bottom shows the difference and also a number of standard
Fig. 2: Location of Queen’s University Belfast PMUs on Irish power system
deviation thresholds. A trade off between a threshold which is
not prone to nuisance tripping (false alarms) and has a small
non detection zone (NDZ) is required to detect when an actual
anomaly has occurred in the PMU data. From Fig 4, 3 standard
deviations was selected as the threshold.
To reduce potential false alarms, and also outliers in the date
causing a trigger, a time delay of 0.5 seconds is implemented
into the process, meaning that the threshold must be violated
for more than 0.5 seconds before a genuine anomaly is de-
tected. Once a genuine anomaly has been detected, the model
is held constant at pre-anomaly values, until the anomaly has
been cleared to stop contamination of the regression model
with anomalous data.
III. EVALUATION WITH REAL POWER SYSTEM DATA
To illustrate the potential of the proposed methodology for
anomaly detection in local PMU data, it’s performance was
evaluated for real power system data collected from the Irish
Power system. These PMUs are a combination of commercial
and open source, developed at Queen’s University Belfast [7],
[8], and the location of each is highlighted in Fig 2.
GPS timing errors, and faulty hardware should not reach the
output of the PMU if the system is designed correctly so will
remain outside the scope of testing for now. However, the data-
stream manipulation does present a very real potential attack
vector in the industry, particularly if the attacked PMU streams
are used in any control or real-time ‘cyber-physical’ systems.
If PMUs are deployed in a large-scale - particularly with an
increase in distributed energy resources (DERs), it’s very likely
that some of these data streams will require traversal over less
secure networks such as the internet. If these streams are not
hardened, then the current PMU communications protocol is
wide-open to manipulation.
To demonstrate this, a wide-area PMU transport simulator
has been developed in the laboratory which allows wide-
area communications to be accurately simulated. The test-bed
Fig. 3: Overview of MITM attack on PMU Data
comprises of a number of PMUs, a commercial PMU and
an OpenPMU. The system allows for data in either of these
streams to be modified in-transit, with frequency, phase angle
and voltage magnitude modifications of the data possible.
The attack works by what is known as a MAC spoofing
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack (Fig 3). Media Access
Control (MAC) is used at the data-link layer in computer
communications, it is the protocol that allows communication
in a switched computer network environment. The attacker
essentially spoofs the MAC address (unique to each computer
in a Local Area Network) of the PMU and PMU data receiver,
becoming a ’middle-man’ in the stream, without either party
knowing. The ’attacker’ is essentially a Python script running
on a Linux machine. The unencrypted/unsigned nature of the
most common PMU data format makes it very susceptible to
this type of attack (IEC 61850-90-5 addresses these issues, as
detailed in [2], but is not commonly deployed yet).
Spoofing attacks like this require access to the local network
at either the PMU sending or receiving ends. This may
sound difficult to achieve, given that the locations of such
devices are often off-limits to anyone but authorized personnel.
However, access to LAN environments can often be achieved
by attackers through back-doors opened through other means -
perhaps by malware infection following a click on a ‘phishing’
email. If unsafe data streams are to remain in use for the short-
medium term, then the proposed anomaly detection method
can be used to ‘flag’ messages for further analysis that aren’t
simply power systems phenomena.
For this study a window size of 4 seconds (equating to
40 frames for PMUs reporting at 10 Hz) was used with
retraining of the regression model occurring every 1 second
(or 10 frames). Meaning that the previous 4 seconds of data is
used to construct the regression model, which is then used, in
conjunction with the predictor variable values, to predict the
next 1 second of response data before retraining occurs. This
process is then continuously repeated.
A. Construction of Initial Regression Model
To begin with historical, non-anomaly data is required
for construction of the initial regression model. From this a
window of data is selected and separated into their respective
predictors and response data, with β values calculated for each
predictor and the intercept. Once the regression model has
been obtained, it is natural to evaluate how effective it is at
summarizing the relationship between X and y, and thus how
good it will be at predicting y by using the RMS error.
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Fig. 4: Investigation into threshold settings for anomaly detection for normal
power system operation data
The dataset used for model training is used to see how
effective it is in the prediction of itself. This is illustrated
in Fig 4, showing observed and predicted response values of
RoCoP for the initial training dataset, an RMS error of 0.03
was calculated for the training dataset.
B. Power System Anomaly Detection Results
1) Case 1 - Line Trip Event: This case study presents a
typical line trip event that was recorded on the PMU situated
at Queen’s, a plot of two of the chosen predictor variables
(frequency and voltage) are shown in Fig 5 (a). It can be
seen from this figure, that up until t ≈ 25 seconds both
system frequency and voltage are varying (as expected) around
their nominal values, at t ≈ 25 seconds the system frequency
has a sharp decrease from 49.98 Hz to 49.84 Hz over 0.1
seconds. The frequency then returns to nominal again before
experiencing an additional fall 49.89 Hz over 0.9 seconds
before rising again and returning to nominal frequency around
t = 42 seconds. Similar to frequency, voltage also experiences
a sudden drop from 251.3 to 250.9 volts in 0.1 seconds, before
further voltage drop to 250.3 volts is registered at the PMU,
agreeing with the frequency plot previously analyzed.
Monitoring results from the observed and predicted RoCoP
are displayed in Fig 5 (b) which shows that pre-event there
are small differences between observed and predicted RoCoP
value, however these fall below the set threshold for anomaly
detection in the PMU data. Agreeing with the variable plots in
Fig 5, the method detects anomalous data when thresholds are
violated at t ≈ 25 seconds when the difference change from 0.1
to -0.9. Also from the monitoring results in Fig 5 (b) it can be
observed that whilst the event is occurring, anomaly thresholds
are held constant as to avoid contamination of the model by
using event data in its construction. This allows a proper return
to nominal value for the variables to be calculated at t = 42
seconds, again agreeing with the variable plot in 5. It should
be noted that in the voltage variable plot the measurement
from t = 50 - 60 seconds is much lower than some of the
event voltage, however as can be seen in the result plot this
does not cause the triggering of any anomaly.
2) Case 2 - MITM Attack on Frequency Measurement:
The modification of system frequency was implemented using
the MAC-spoofing MITM technique described in Section III.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
49.8
49.85
49.9
49.95
50
50.05
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
(H
z)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time (second)
250
251
252
V
ol
ta
ge
 (V
)
(a) Power System Variables
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-4
-2
0
2
R
oC
oP
 (
 
)
Actual Predict
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time (second)
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
D
iff
er
en
ce
(b) Anomaly Detection monitoring
Fig. 5: Case 1: (a) frequency and voltage plots for line trip event, and (b)
comparison of observed and predicted RoCoP values (top plot), and anomaly
detection results showing the difference between observed and predicted
values and thresholds for detection (bottom plot)
The attacker script is first set to the desired ramp and test
period. The attacker PC is then plugged into the same physical
network as the sending (or receiving) PMU - this would
emulate a physical security breach in a substation or where
the data is received. Once the script is executed it detects
PMU data streams (using the common TCP port used for PMU
data and the known footprint, or signature of C37.118.2 data),
the system then initiates a MITM attack through spoofing
operations, and places itself as a ’pathway’ in the data stream.
Once the path is established, the attacker can then initiate the
manipulation of the data, taking the incoming data points,
one at a time, and modifying them by the correct amount
to replicate attack parameters. The modified packet is then
sent to the intended recipient, where there are no indications
that any data modification has taken place. This attack action
can be applied to any of the system variables and over an in
discriminant amount of time.
Displayed in Fig 6 (a) is a MITM attack that targeted live
frequency data being reported by a PMU. In this case the
frequency was increased from 49.5 Hz to 55 Hz over the period
of 5 seconds. This type of frequency ramp could be interpreted
as an islanding event (when a distributed generator continues
to energize local loads after isolation from the main system),
where generation is higher than load. If distributed generation
assets were using this data for islanding protection, then they
might disconnect or the system operator might intentionally
isolate that part of the network.
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(b) Anomaly Detection monitoring
Fig. 6: Case 2: (a) frequency and voltage plots for frequency intrusion with
insert of pre-anomaly system frequency also shown, and (b) anomaly detection
results for frequency intrusion with inserts showing pre-anomaly monitoring
Anomaly detection monitoring results are presented in Fig 6
(b), the insert plots show results pre-anomaly and it can be
seen that there is a small difference between observed and
predicted RoCoP values (top plot), and as expected these fall
between RMS error thresholds previously selected during the
initialization phase of the methodology (bottom plot). It can
be observed from the lower plot in Fig 6 (b) that at t =
50 seconds the difference between observed and predicted
RoCoP values begin to exceed the set RMS error threshold and
once a genuine anomaly has been detected in the PMU data,
thresholds are held again. At t = 63 seconds the methodology
detects the end of the anomaly, which corresponds with the
system frequency plot in 6 (a). Once the anomalous data has
been cleared from the system, anomaly thresholds begin to
update again and difference between observed and predicted
RoCoP falls between calculated thresholds.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper a methodology for the detection of local
power system anomalies is proposed. The multiple linear
regression method employs frequency, phase angle and voltage
magnitude; collected from PMUs located across the Irish
power system. Two case studies are presented as preliminary
evaluations of the methodology, they demonstrate the potential
for real-time applications and historical analysis. Setting a
threshold of 3 × the nominal RMS error was demonstrated
as a reliable method of detecting anomalies in the PMU data.
The method proposed has several advantages including self
calibration to local conditions, both locational and temporal,
through the application of the RMS error. The quick ‘flag-
ging mechanism’ has applications for real-time PMU data
that could be applied at the central processing level or at
remote locations. Flagging is used to highlight, anticipated and
unanticipated, anomalies in data streams, before the relevant
data is forwarded for more computationally intensive event
categorization. The flagging mechanism could also be applied
as a method of highlighting suspicious data. For example,
if PMU data is being used as an input for a cyber-physical
system, then control system may require two or more PMU
streams to corroborate before actuating any physical system
components.
This method is still under development and some of the
conditions for anomaly detection and clearing are at present
ad hoc; such as using a 0.5 second time delay before triggering
a genuine anomaly. In practice, this may be slow and in some
cases genuine anomalies may occur for less than this delay.
While this delay is an arbitrary value, future investigation will
determine a more optimal solution. At present this regression
method has only been applied to RoCoP, the next step will be
to apply it to other system variables. The method described
can easily be applied to frequency, phase angle, voltage and
their derivatives simultaneously; this may also give insight into
the nature of the anomalies.
Future work will look at some enhancements to improve
and further validate the methodology presented. Firstly, an
investigation into optimal window size and frequency of
regression model retraining will be carried out. Secondly,
the simultaneous regression technique on multiple system
variables will be carried out to identify if it can yield a
more robust detection of anomalies, anomaly categorization
and identify MITM attacks. Finally, the results from multiple
locations will be combined to develop this from a local to a
wide-area detection method.
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